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                                                                 ABSTRACT
Contrary to the popular assumption that self-enhancement improves task motivation and 
future performance, I propose that both inflated or deflated self-assessments of performance 
are linked to an increased likelihood of practicing self-handicapping and having relatively 
poor performance in future tasks. Consistent with this proposal, I found that irrespective of 
the level of actual performance, compared to accurate self-assessment, both inflated and 
deflated self-assessments of task performance are associated with a greater tendency to (a) 
practice self-handicapping (Study 1: prefer to work under distraction; Study 2: withhold 
preparatory effort), (b) perform relatively poorly in a subsequent task (Study 3), (c) have 
relatively low academic achievement (Study 4), and (c) report relatively low level of 
subjective well-being (Study 5). I discuss these results in terms of their educational 
implications.
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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
             The forecourt of the Temple of Apollo at Delphi is inscribed with the ancient Greek 
aphorism “Know thyself.” This inscription invites the visitors to the Temple to acknowledge 
their strengths and weaknesses. The founding fathers of psychology, including William James 
and Sigmund Freud, exalted the virtue of self-knowledge, holding self-understanding to be a 
hallmark of psychological health.
Nevertheless, many self-evaluation investigators tend to emphasize the benefits of self-
enhancement and diminish the value of self-criticism. For instance, some theorists argue that 
having positive illusions of the self may confer some psychological benefits (e.g., Brown & 
Dutton, 1995; Taylor & Brown, 1988; Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003a; 
2003b). In addition, folk theories, especially those that emphasize the benefits of promoting self-
enhancement (e.g., reinforcing positive self-perceptions, providing unrealistically positive 
performance feedback) are featured in numerous popular books, the media, and daily 
communications (Miller, Wang, Sandel, & Cho, 2002), and are widely held among lay people 
and professionals (Seligman, Reivich, Jaycox, & Gillham, 1995).
Despite the popular support for the beneficial effects of self-enhancement over accurate 
self-assessment, the evidence for these popular beliefs is mixed. The benefits of self-
enhancement have been extensively researched since Taylor and Brown (1988) published a 
provocative article arguing for benefits of positive illusions of the self. Researchers arguing for 
the psychological advantages of self-enhancement have made their case by linking positive 
illusions to better mental health (e.g., lower depression, higher happiness, and better 
psychological adjustment; Taylor & Brown, 1988; Taylor et al., 2003a), better intellectual 
2functioning (e.g., higher motivation, persistence, and performance; Felson, 1984; Isen & 
Daubman, 1984; Isen & Means, 1983), and better interpersonal relationship (Bohrnstedt & 
Felson, 1983).
However, harmful consequences of positive illusions of the self have also been reported 
(Colvin & Griffo, 2008; Colvin, Block, & Funder, 1995; Colvin & Block, 1994a; Colvin & 
Block, 1994b; Greham, Lane, ManMillan, Bocian, & Ward, 2000; Robins & Beer, 2001; Klein 
& Cooper, 2008; Klein & Cerully, 2007; Kurt & Paulhus, 2008; Kwan, John, Robins, & Kuang, 
2008; McNulty, O’Mara, & Karney, 2008; McNulty & Karney, 2004). For example, Colvin et al. 
(1995) found that overly positive self-evaluations are related to more maladjustment and 
relational problems. Also, Greham et al. (2000) reported that illusory positive self-perceptions 
are associated with poorer social skill, more problem behaviors, and lower academic 
competence. Similarly, Kwan et al. (2008) found that the self-enhancement bias is associated 
with low levels of resilience, high levels of defensiveness, poorer social skills, high levels of 
narcissism, and lower grade point average (GPA). In short, whether self-enhancement is 
beneficial or detrimental is still an open research question. 
Given the inconsistent research findings on the benefits (or costs) of self-enhancement, 
recent studies have examined in what conditions self-enhancement is associated with better (or 
worse) outcomes (e.g., Paulhus, 1998; Kwan et al., 2008; Kwan et al., 2004). For example, 
Paulhus (2008) found that the tendency to self-enhance is a mixed blessing: It is associated with 
adaptive intrapersonal outcomes (e.g., self-esteem, ego-resilience) and maladaptive interpersonal 
behaviors (e.g., hostility, defensive, arrogance). However, no known studies have explicitly
examined whether self-enhancement compared to accurate self-assessments produces more 
beneficial (or detrimental) effects, although as I will explain in the Introduction to Study 4, such 
3comparison can help clarify important issues in the measurement of self-enhancement and 
therefore further illuminate the psychological consequences of self-enhancement. Accordingly, 
in the present research, I critically evaluate the benefits of self-enhancement relative to accurate 
self-assessment. I contend that both favorable and unfavorable misperceptions of one’s task 
performance in relatively familiar performance task can have important psychological costs. This 
contention is based on the following premises:
I. Individuals with repeated prior experiences of taking performance tasks in a 
certain domain (e.g., math) should have some, albeit imperfect, knowledge of 
their actual performance after taking a test in the same domain (hereafter referred 
to as the focal test). That it, individuals may expect their performance on the 
focal test to fall within a certain range (hereafter referred to as the expected 
performance range). For example, Pat may be led by past experiences to expect 
an average performance at level Y. However, Pat would also expect the actual 
performance on the focal test to fluctuate around level Y and falls within Y + k, 
where Y + k represents the upper limit and Y – k represents the lower limit of the 
expected performance range, respectively. 
II. When asked to estimate their performance on the focal test, some individuals 
(self-enhancers) are inclined to give estimates that are closer to the upper limit of 
the expected performance range and hence tend to overestimate their 
performance relative to actual performance. In contrast, others (self-effacers) are 
inclined to give estimates that are closer to the lower limit of the range and hence 
tend to underestimate their performance relative to actual performance. Whereas 
the self-enhancement bias reflects the motivational predilection to accept overly 
4positive perceptions of one’s performance, the self-effacement bias reflects the 
motivational predilection to accept overly negative perceptions of one’s 
performance. The self-enhancement and self-effacement biases are particularly 
pronounced when individuals are asked to estimate how they perform compared 
to their peers (as shown in the better than average effect and the below average 
effect, Alicke & Govorun, 2005; Kruger, 1999), because the range of expected 
performance for relative performance judgments is broad due to their relatively 
low inferential certainty (Giladi & Klar, 2002).
III. Because individuals have some but imperfect knowledge of their actual 
performance on the focal task, performance feedback can temporarily bias the 
individuals’ perceptions of their performance. Positive performance feedback can 
lead individuals to position perceptions of their performance toward the upper 
limit of the expected performance range, and hence temporarily create a self-
enhancement bias for low performers. Similarly, negative performance feedback 
can lead individuals to position perceptions of their performance toward the 
lower limit of the expected performance range, and hence temporarily create a 
self-effacement bias for high performers.
IV. Drawing on the evidence from the self-esteem enhancement and protection 
literature (e.g., Green, Sedikides, & Gregg, 2008; see below for elaboration), I
argue that both chronic or temporarily induced self-enhancement and self-
effacement would increase an aversion to verify one’s “self-misperceptions” in 
subsequent tasks – Self-enhancers do not want future performance information to 
disconfirm a rosy view of the self, whereas self-effacers do not want future 
5performance information to further confirm their already unfavorable view of the 
self. Therefore, they are likely to use behavioral self-handicapping strategies 
(e.g., effort withdrawal, choosing to perform subsequent tasks under distraction) 
that would render performance outcomes less diagnostic of actual ability. Such 
self-handicapping strategies could hurt performance in subsequent tasks as well 
as long-term academic performance (e.g., GPA) and lower individuals’ 
subjective well-being (Snyder & Smith, 1982). In contrast, individuals with 
accurate self-assessments are not threatened by diagnostic performance
information (Dweck, 2006). Instead, they can use veridical information of their 
current performance to plan for remedial actions (Forsterling & Morgenstern, 
2002; Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 1999). Thus, accurate self-assessment is 
associated with a reduced tendency to engage in self-handicapping strategies, 
relatively better short-term and long-term performance, and higher subjective 
well-being. 
To flesh out this idea, in the next sections, I will review the pertinent literature on self-
knowledge of performance and the cognitive and motivational sources of self-misperceptions of 
performance. Next, I will elaborate on the possible psychological costs of self-enhancement and 
self-effacement. Finally, I will present three experiments that tested the hypothesis that compared 
to accurate self-assessment, both temporarily induced self-enhancement and self-effacement 
would lead to a greater tendency to engage in self-handicapping strategies (e.g., preparatory 
effort withdrawal in Study 1 and preference to perform subsequent tasks under distraction in 
Study 2), and lower performance in a subsequent task (Study 3). In Studies 4 and 5, to make 
contact with previous results from correlational studies that evaluated the achievement and well-
6being benefits of self-enhancements, I measured individual differences in self-assessment and 
directional self-misperceptions and assessed the correlation of these measures with long-term 
academic performance (GPA, Study 4) and subjective well-being (Study 5). 
Self-Knowledge of Task Performance
Self-assessment research has shown that most people have some knowledge of their 
actual performance, although the accuracy of such knowledge tends to vary across performance 
tasks. For example, in Kruger and Dunning’s (1999) studies, participants took a humor (or
logical reasoning) test and were asked to judge (a) how funny or logical they were relative to 
other students, and (b) how many questions they thought that they had answered correctly. The 
correlation between actual performance and self-reported performance ranged from .05 to .50, 
depending on the nature of the tests.
Nonetheless, many people tend to report biased assessments of their abilities and 
attributes (e.g., Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995; Kruger & Dunning, 
1999; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Moreover, there are considerable individual differences in the 
extent of accuracy in reported self-assessments. Some individuals tend to self-enhance, whereas 
others tend to self-efface (John & Robin, 1994; Kruger & Dunning, 1999). For example, in one 
study, John and Robins (1994) had participants engage in a managerial group discussion task and 
rank their own performance on the task. Each participant’s performance was also ranked by other 
group members and by 11 assessment staff members. Although self-perceptions were correlated 
with staff assessment, indicating some degree of sensitivity to one’s actual performance, on 
average, the participants evaluated their performance slightly more positively than did their peers 
or the staff. More importantly, there were substantial individual differences in self-evaluation 
accuracy, ranging from sizable self-enhancement to considerable self-criticism. In short,
7although self-assessments are moderately correlated with actual performance, some individuals 
exaggerate their performance considerably while others understate it sizably.  
Several explanations have been put forward to account for individual variations in the 
acccuracy of self-assessments. One explanation is that such variations result from people’s 
cognitive biases (Giladi & Klar, 2002; Klar & Giladi, 1997; 1999) or lack of the metacognitive 
ability to tell how good/bad they are (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). Another explanation is that
inaccuracy in self-assessments arises from the motivation to self-enhance (Sedikides, Gaertner, 
& Toguchi, 2003; Sedikides & Strube, 1997; Taylor & Brown, 1988). This motivational account 
posits that people are motivated to evaluate themselves favoably independent of their actual 
performance.
There is evidence for both accounts. For example, consistent with the cognitive 
explanation, inaccuracy in self-assessments diminishes after people have been trained to appraise 
their performance accurately (Kruger and Dunning, 1999). However, in line with the 
motivational account, there is also evidence that although high (vs. low) self-esteem individuals 
assess their performance more favorably irrespective of their actual performance, this bias is 
attenuated in the presence of a monetary incentive for accurate self-assessment (Kim & Chiu, 
20010a).
Apparently, both cognitive and motivational factors contribute to accuracy and biases in 
people’s appraisal of their task performance, and the relative contribution of cognitive and 
motivational factors may depend on people’s prior experiences with the performance task. When 
estimating their performance on a novel task (e.g., an unfamiliar logical reasoning test or humor 
test), most college students do not know their ability in the task domain. Accordingly, 
metacognitive awareness of one’s ability has relatively strong impact on performance estimates 
8(Kruger & Dunning, 1999). In contrast, for a familiar intellectual ability task (e.g., a math or 
verbal ability test), most students have acquired from their prior experiences with this task some 
knowledge of their actual performance on the task. Over- or under-statements of one’s 
performance in this task may reflect the motivation to self-enhance (self-efface). 
In the present research, I am interested in the psychological and performance implications 
of motivated favorable and unfavorable misperceptions of one’s task performance. Accordingly, 
I selected ability tests (e.g., math tests) that are familiar to most college students, assuming that 
these students would have some but imperfect knowledge of their actual performance on these 
tests, and their biases in self-reported performance on these tests are likely to reflect the 
motivation to self-enhance or self-efface.
To verify my assumption that college students possess some knowledge of their 
performance on my tests, I conducted a pilot test with 61 students from an introductory 
psychology class in a public university in the United States. The participants completed 10 
randomly selected math questions from the SATs (Scholastic Aptitude Tests) in 10 minutes and 
estimated how many questions they thought they had answered correctly. To evoke an accuracy 
motivation, the experimenter emphasized that the research concerns how accurately people could 
estimate their performance. The mean self-reported performance on the test was 4.48 items (SD
= 1.76), which was slightly higher than the mean actual performance (M = 4.18 items, SD = 
1.85), t(61) = 2.17, p < .05, indicating a small tendency toward overstating one’s performance. 
Of the 61 participants, 39% (N = 24) correctly estimated the number of correct answers they 
made. Another 27 participants (44%) over- or underestimated their performance by one item 
only. The correlation between actual performance and self-reported performance was .81. These 
9results indicated that the participants could be fairly accurate when they were explicitly asked to 
form accurate self-assessment. 
Downstream Consequences of Misperceptions of Performance
Given that people have some knowledge of their actual performance in a familiar test, I 
am interested in the downstream consequences of misperceptions of one’s performance. 
Conceptually, I can classify people into four conceptual categories based on their actual task 
performance and their performance perceptions. The first category consists of low performers 
who misperceive their actual performance on the focal task to be high (self-enhancers). The 
second category consists of low performers who have accurate knowledge of their performance 
on the focal task (accurate low performers). The third category consists of high performers who 
perceive their actual performance on the focal task to be low (self-effacers). The last category 
consists of high performers who have accurate knowledge of their performance on the focal task 
(accurate high performers).
I posit that compared to accurate performers, self-enhancers are more motivated to 
practice self-handicapping. When individuals view (are led by task feedback to view) their 
performance on the focal task as higher than the anticipated performance based on their self-
knowledge, they are motivated to maintain the positive self-view by avoiding future performance 
information that would disconfirm this self-view. Thus, they would engage in self-handicapping, 
defined as a process wherein a person, in anticipation of potential self-esteem loss due to 
inadequate performance that may implicate one’s ability, adopts behaviors that could discount 
the ability implications of poor performance (Snyder & Smith, 1982). For example, they may 
withhold preparatory effort in an upcoming task or choose to perform the task under distraction 
so that they can attribute poor task performance to lack of preparation or the distraction instead 
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of attributing it to their ability. These strategies are self-handicapping because they lower future 
performance. 
These strategies will also put their users under chronic evaluation apprehension and 
lower their subjective well-being. Overly positive self-assessments are difficult to maintain;
those with overly positive self-assessments would experience emotional distress when they 
encounter circumstances that challenge their positive self-perceptions. For example, as 
Baumeister (1989) argues, “A substantially inflated view of self is difficult to sustain on a day-
to-day basis, for even mediocre performance threatens the public and private image of self that 
one has cultivated” (p. 184). Excessively favorable self-assessments can intensify concerns with 
self-evaluations (Dweck, 2002; 2006; Kamins & Dweck, 1999; Mueller & Dweck, 1998), 
leading to engagement in self-defeating practices (e.g., self-handicapping behaviors) for the sake 
of protecting a threatened self-image. Consistent with this idea, individuals with inflated self-
ratings (compared to ratings provided by their close acquaintances, friends, observers) are 
perceived to be poorly adjusted, bragging, hostile and self-defeating (Colvin et al., 1995; 
Paulhus, 1988). Accordingly, like self-effacers who have chronic negative self-regards, self-
enhancers may also experience low levels of subjective well-being. As shown in a recent study 
(Kim & Chiu, 2010b), like students who underestimate their actual performance, students who 
overestimate their performance also report higher levels of depression compared to those who 
accurately assess their performance. Thus, I predicted that individuals with unrealistic (vs. 
realistic) positive self-assessments would experience lower levels of subjective-well being.
In contrast, I posit that compared to accurate performers, self-effacers are motivated to 
practice self-handicapping. Past research shows that self-effacers tend to have a heightened 
concern for performance, and often experience intense worry, self-doubt and anxiety when they 
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are assigned to a challenging achievement task (Ferrari & Thompson, 2006; Pualengco, Kim & 
Chiu, 2009b; Warner & Moore, 2004). Due to their intense self-doubt, they tend to underestimate 
their actual performance. However, because of their heightened concern for performance, they 
are often apprehensive of receiving future performance information that would further confirm 
their perception of low ability. Like self-enhancers, these individuals are also likely to practice 
self-handicapping that would lower short-term and long-term performance and subjective well-
being. 
Self-effacement in the context of the present research is different from defensive 
pessimism (Norem & Cantor, 1986). Defensive pessimists anxiously anticipate poor 
performance in a task; nonetheless, they work hard on the task to maximize their chance of 
success. Thus, defensive pessimists tend to increase their effort investment and show 
improvement in the subsequent task. However, driven by self-doubt and performance concerns, 
self-effacers in the present research context have serious self-doubt over their performance in the 
previous task and seek to minimize the potentially damaging effects of possible failures on self-
evaluation by practicing self-handicapping; they tend to withdraw effort and consequently have 
poor performance in the upcoming task. This distinction is consistent with the distinction Norem 
(2008) made between active self-criticism (defensive pessimism) that is in the service of possible 
self-enhancement goals, and passive or static negative self-evaluations that characterize chronic 
self-effacers.
In contrast, accurate self-assessors, irrespective of their level of actual performance, are 
less threatened by performance feedback in the upcoming tasks and hence less likely to use self-
handicapping strategies. Instead, they tend to use knowledge of their current performance to plan 
remedial actions, which could lead to improved performance in future achievement tests. 
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Consistent with this, past studies have revealed a positive association between accurate self-
assessment of performance and the belief in malleable intelligence (Dweck, 2006), which in turn 
predicts the motivation to engage in remedial actions (Hong et al., 1999). Furthermore, accurate 
assessment of performance also motivates individuals to engage in preparatory effort and hence 
improves performance in subsequent tasks (Forsterling & Morgenstern, 2002). 
The above analysis is also consistent with growing research evidence on the 
psychological costs and benefits of positive self-perceptions. Although positive self-perceptions 
have been shown to be associated with a broad range of psychological benefits (Brown & 
Dutton, 1995; Taylor & Brown, 1988), these perceptions may have negative psychological 
consequences when they become overly discrepant with the individuals’ actual qualities (Colvin 
& Griffo, 2008; Colvin, Block, & Funder, 1995; Colvin & Block, 1994a; Colvin & Block, 
1994b; Robins & Beer, 2001; Klein & Cooper, 2008; Klein & Cerully, 2007; Kurt & Paulhus, 
2008; Kwan, John, Robins, & Kuang, 2008; McNulty, O’Mara, & Karney, 2008; McNulty & 
Karney, 2004). For example, unrealistic positive self-assessments measured by the difference 
between self-assessments and peer (or expert) ratings are related to more maladjustment, more 
relational problems, poorer social skills, more problem behaviors (Colvin at al., 1995; Greham, 
et al., 2002; Kwan et al., 2008), lower academic competence, and lower subjective well-being 
(Robins & Beers, 2001; Kwan et al., 2008). Similarly, unrealistic positive self-assessment of
future health outcomes predicts higher health risk, and more risky behavioral intentions and 
behaviors (Klein & Cooper, 2008). In short, although positive self-perceptions are associated 
with positive social and performance outcomes, the psychological benefits of such perceptions 
disappear and even turn into liabilities when these perceptions are grossly inflated (Papps & 
O’Carroll, 1998).
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I will report three experiments and two individual difference studies that tested these 
ideas. I hypothesize that compared to accurate self-assessments, chronic or temporarily induced
self-enhancement or self-effacement would promote a tendency to practice self-handicapping 
(Studies 1 and 2), lower task performance (Study 3) and have lower levels of subjective well-
being (Study 5). Finally, individuals who make self-enhancive or self-effacing performance 
assessments spontaneously may have a chronic tendency to make such assessments. Because 
academic performance is negatively related to self-handicapping and effort withdrawal (Snyder 
& Smith, 1982), if individuals who make unrealistic self-assessments spontaneously are likely to 
engage in self-handicapping and effort withdrawal, these individuals may also have relatively 
low academic performance. I tested this hypothesis in Study 4. If the results support my 
hypothesis, it would suggest that helping students to acknowledge their strengths and come to 
terms with their weaknesses could increase students’ learning motivation, performance and 
subjective well-being.
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CHAPTER 2
STUDY 1: PREFERENCE TO WORK UNDER DISTRACTION
I hypothesize that when low performers receive performance feedback that exceeds their 
expectation, they would be motivated to maintain positive perceptions of their performance by 
avoiding opportunities to verify their actual performance. For example, if they need to take the 
same task, they would choose to take it in a non-diagnostic condition (e.g., taking the test in a 
noisy environment so that that they can attribute their poor performance in the subsequent test to 
environmental distraction). Likewise, when high performers receive performance feedback that 
falls below their expectation, the feedback may cast doubt on their chronic positive self-views. 
Consequently, out of self-protection concerns, these individuals may avoid situations that would 
confirm the validity of the feedback. Thus, if required to take the same test again, they would 
also choose to take it in a non-diagnostic test condition. In contrast, individuals who receive 
accurate feedback, independent of their level of performance, would not be as motivated to 
practice self-handicapping. The present study was designed to test these hypothesized effects of 
temporarily induced self-enhancement and self-effacement on the motivation to verify one’s
actual performance.
Method
The participants were 283 European American undergraduates (180 females) from an 
introductory psychology class in a public university in the United States. Their age ranged from 
18 to 21 (M = 18.65 years, SD = 1.30). 
In each experimental session, 4 to 6 participants, seated in separate cubicles, were given 
10 minutes to complete 25 randomly selected math problems from the SATs. At the completion 
of the first task, the experimenter collected the tests from the participants and pretended to grade 
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them in another cubicle. At this point, the participants were randomly assigned to receive bogus 
high performance feedback or bogus low performance feedback. In addition, I ran a control 
condition (no feedback) later to identify whether the effect was due to misperceptions of 
performance or accuracy in performance perception. In the high and low performance feedback 
conditions, the experimenter returned a few minutes later to the participants’ cubicles to inform 
the participants of their performance relative to the normative performance in their university. 
The participants were told that the norm was based on 800 university students’ performance on 
the same test. The experimenter showed the participants a histogram depicting the normally 
distributed performance of the 800 university students on the test. There were 10 classes in the 
histogram, which were marked Level 1 (the worst performance) to Level 10 (the best 
performance). In the high performance feedback condition, the participants were told that their 
performance was at Level 9. In the low performance feedback condition, the participants were 
told that their performance was at Level 2. Participants in the no feedback control condition did 
not receive any feedback. 
Given that the task was a familiar intellectual task, the participants should have some 
knowledge of their actual ability in the task domain. Note however that although the participants 
might know from taking the test the number of items they had answered correctly, they might not 
have very good knowledge of how their performance compared to their peers’ performance. The 
normative nature of the feedback increased the likelihood that the participants would accept the 
feedback as valid. Thus, low performers receiving high performance feedback would temporarily 
go through a self-enhancive experience; they thought they performed better than expected and 
would be motivated to preserve this positive self-view. In contrast, high performers receiving 
low performance feedback would temporarily go through a self-effacing experience; they felt 
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that their performance was worse than expected and would be concerned that their “low 
performance” was indicative of their actual ability.
After the feedback manipulation, the participants learned that they would participate in an 
“unrelated” experiment regarding the effect of noise on test performance. They were required to 
take a similar math test in the presence of different amounts of noise. The experimenter then 
explained to the participants how noise could impact performance according to past research 
findings. From the experimenter, the participants learned that independent of the test takers’ 
actual ability, the presence of heavy noise could hurt performance on math tests severely. Next, 
the participants learned that there were 7 noise levels (1 = no noise at all; 7 = heaviest noise) and 
were asked to choose the level of noise that would be present while they were working on the 
next math test. 
After the participants had indicated their choice, they were asked to fill out a survey 
while the experimenter prepared for the test. I included an item in the survey to check the 
effectiveness of the feedback manipulation. Specifically, the participants were asked to rate their 
performance on the previous task on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = really bad, 7 = very good).
To rule out the possibility that the predicted result reflected a greater challenge-seeking 
tendency when individuals received feedback that was higher or lower than their expected 
performance, I also measured the participants’ challenge-seeking tendency. Specifically, I asked 
the participants to indicate how likely they would take a very challenging task that only a few 
people would succeed (1 = least likely, 7 = very likely).
Finally, to further rule out the possibility that my results are due to expectancy 
disconfirmation (high performers receiving low performance feedback and low performers 
receiving high feedback), I also measured how intense the participants experienced (a) 
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disappointment and (b) happiness. The participants indicated their responses to each item on a 
scale that ranged from 1 (not at all) to 7 (with maximum intensity).
Results and Discussion
Men had higher performance on the math test (M = 7.12, SD = 3.34) than did women (M
= 5.54, SD = 2.70), F(1, 281) = 19.04, p < .001, 2p = .06. The mean number of correct answers 
for all participants was 6.12 (SD =3.04). In addition, male participants chose higher noise levels 
(M = 3.89, SD= 2.02) than did female participants (M = 2.91, SD= 1.70), F(1, 281) = 18.86, p
<.001,2p = .06. The mean noise level for all participants was 3.27 (SD = 1.88).
The performance feedback manipulation was successful. I regressed perceived 
performance on mean-centered test performance, feedback and their interaction. As expected, 
compared to participants in the control condition (M = 2.39, SD = 1.95), participants receiving 
low performance feedback condition perceived their performance less favorably (M = 1.66, SD = 
0.82), t(277) = -3.68, p < .001; whereas those receiving high performance feedback condition 
(M= 5.08, SD =1.98) perceived their performance more favorably, t(277) = 14.78, p < .001. More 
importantly, the interaction of performance feedback and test performance on perceived 
performance was not significant, F(2, 277) = 1.54, ns, indicating that the performance feedback 
manipulation had comparable effects on both high and low performers.  
To test my hypothesis, following Aiken and West (1991), we regressed noise level on 
test performance (treated as a mean-centered continuous predictor), feedback condition (high,
low, or control), gender, and their interactions. In this (and the subsequent) regression analysis 
that used feedback as a predictor, I coded feedback into two dummy variables, with the control 
condition as the reference category. No gender differences were found and I did not consider 
gender further. The predicted interaction of test performance and feedback was significant, F(2, 
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277) = 4.70, p < .05, 2p = .02. To understand the nature of the interaction, I examined how 
feedback affected the level of noise chosen at different levels of test performance. As shown in 
Figure 1, simple slope analysis (Aiken & West, 1991) results showed that when test performance 
was high (one standard deviation above its mean), participants receiving low performance 
feedback chose higher levels of noise (Ye = 4.30) than did those in the control condition (Ye = 
3.32),1 F(1, 277) = 4.84, p < .05, and the high performance feedback condition (Ye = 3.30), F(1, 
277) = 3.47, p < .05. The level of noise chosen in the high performance feedback and control 
conditions did not differ, F(1, 277) = 0.002, ns. In contrast, when test performance was low (one 
standard deviation below its mean), participants receiving high performance feedback chose
higher levels of noise (Ye = 3.58) than did those receiving low performance feedback (Ye = 2.73), 
F(1, 277) = 4.27, p < .05, and those in the control condition (Ye = 2.85), F( 1, 277) = 3.75, p <
.05. The level of noise chosen in the low performance feedback and control conditions did not 
differ, F(1, 277) = 0.10, ns.
Next, I examined the relationship between test performance and noise level in each 
feedback condition. In the control condition, test performance was not related to the level of 
noise chosen, B = 0.07, t(131) = 1.41, p > .10. As expected, in the low performance feedback 
condition, participants with higher performance chose higher levels of noise, B = 0.23, t(71) = 
3.24, p <.001. Also as expected, in the high performance feedback condition, test performance 
                                               
1
The estimated value (Ye) in simple slope analysis is the predicted value of the criterion variable estimated from the 
regression model when the predictor variable was at one standard deviation below or above the mean. For the sake 
of brevity, I have omitted the phrase “were predicted to” when I described the simple slope analysis results. For 
example, the sentence “participants receiving low performance feedback chose higher levels of noise” should be 
interpreted as “participants receiving low performance feedback were predicted to choose higher levels of noise”. 
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was negatively associated with the level of nose chosen, B = -0.04, t(75) = -0.51, p >.10, 
although the association was not significant.2
Furthermore, I did not find any significant effects when I regressed participants’
challenge-seeking tendency on test performance, feedback, and their interaction, Fs < 1.75. Thus, 
the Test Performance X Feedback interaction on noise level was not attributable to differential 
challenge-seeking tendencies in the different experimental conditions.
I also regressed each of the two emotions on test performance, feedback and their 
interaction. The Test Performance X Feedback interaction was not significant on both emotion 
measures, F(2, 277) < 1.76, ns, suggesting that my results were not driven by expectation 
disconfirmation. The main effect of feedback on disappointment was significant, F(2, 277) = 
9.84, p < .01. Compared to control participants (M = 2.57), participants who received low 
performance feedback were more disappointed (M = 3.22), t(277) = 2.85, p < .01; and 
participants who received high performance feedback were also less disappointed (M = 2.10), 
t(277) = -2.18, p < .05. Note, however, that in all conditions, the mean level of disappointment 
was moderately low. The main effect of feedback on happiness was also significant, F(2, 277) = 
6.85, p < .01. Compared to control participants (M = 4.00), participants receiving positive 
feedback (M = 4.35) were happier, t(277) = 2.45, p < .05; and participants receiving negative 
feedback were less happy (M = 3.71), although the latter difference was not significant, t(277) = 
1.78, p = .08. The significant main effects of feedback on emotions indicated that the participants 
felt the emotional impact of the feedback. However, low performers who received high 
                                               
2
In this study and in Study 3, I had more participants in the control condition than in the other two conditions. I 
randomly assigned participants to the high or low feedback condition, and added the control condition later to 
identify whether the effect was due to misperceptions of performance or accuracy in performance perception. With 
the greater N in the control condition, it should be easier to obtain in this condition a significant correlation between 
performance and the dependent measure. Nonetheless, this association was not significant in both studies.
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performance feedback were not happier than high performers who received the same feedback, 
and high performers who received low performance feedback were not more disappointed than 
low performers who received the same feedback.
In summary, among both high and low performers, receiving inaccurate feedback 
increased the chance of practicing self-handicapping. Low performers who received high 
performance feedback (vs. low performance or no feedback) and high performers who received 
low performance feedback (vs. high performance or no feedback) were more likely to choose to 
take the same test in a non-diagnostic (noisy) environment. 
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CHAPTER 3
STUDY 2: PREPARATORY EFFORT WITHDRAWAL
Study 1 provided the first evidence that inaccurate feedback increases the likelihood of 
practicing self-handicapping. The present study seeks to extend this result to preparatory effort 
withdrawal, another major self-handicapping behavior. I hypothesize that low performers 
receiving high performance feedback and high performers receiving low performance feedback 
would be more likely than those who receive accurate feedback to withhold preparatory effort for 
an upcoming ability test as an attempt to obscure the link between test performance and actual 
ability. 
                                                                       Method
The participants were 136 European American undergraduates (77 females) from an 
introductory psychology class in a public university in the United States. Their age ranged from 
18 to 23 (M = 19.18 years, SD = 1.03). The procedures were identical to those in Study 1 with 
the exception that I did not include a control condition in the current study. After receiving low 
or high bogus performance feedback, the participants learned that they would take another task 
that assessed their intellectual ability. They were told that before taking the ability test, they 
would be given a chance to work on a tutorial exercise that would enhance their performance in 
the ability test. 
Next, the participants were given 8 minutes to work on the tutorial exercise. They were 
told that taking the tutorial exercise was optional. If they did not want to work on the exercise, 
they could wait for 8 minutes until other participants had completed the exercise. After they had 
started the exercise, they could stop any time if they wanted to. The participants were assured 
that the tutorial exercise would not be graded and that they should not leave any identifying 
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information on the exercise. The exercise consisted of 39 anagrams, each with 2 or 3 correct 
solutions. No participants completed all the anagrams within the allotted time. I considered the 
number of questions attempted as a measure of the participants’ preparatory effort. In addition, I 
measured how many anagrams participants had solved within the allotted time. Upon completing 
the task, the participants completed the same manipulation check item as in Study 1. 
Results and Discussion
As in Study 1, men had higher performance on the math test (M = 8.78, SD = 3.60) than 
did women (M = 5.56, SD = 2.58), F(1, 134) = 37.00, p < .001, 2p = .22. The mean number of 
correct answers for all participants was 6.96 (SD =3.44). No gender differences were found on 
the performance of the anagram test, F(1, 134) = 0.05, ns. The mean number of correct solutions 
for all participants was 24.73 (SD = 8.31).
The performance feedback manipulation was successful. Participants in the low 
performance feedback condition perceived their performance less favorably (M = 1.92, SD = 
0.78) than did those in the high performance condition (M = 5.22, SD = 1.61, F(1, 132) = 218.39, 
p < .001. Again, the interaction of performance feedback and test performance on perceived 
performance was not significant, F(1, 132) = 0.92, ns, indicating that the performance feedback 
manipulation had comparable effects on both high and low performers. 
To test my hypothesis, I regressed the amount of preparatory effort (the number of 
anagrams attempted) on the math test performance (mean-centered), feedback condition (high vs. 
low), gender, and their interactions. Again, no gender differences were found and I did not 
consider gender further. Results showed that participants who received unrealistically positive or 
negative performance feedback attempted fewer anagrams than did those who received accurate 
performance feedback, F(1, 128) for the Performance X Feedback interaction = 6.15, p = .01. As 
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shown in Figure 2, among high performers (participants with performance at one standard 
deviation above the mean), those who received high performance feedback attempted more 
anagrams (Ye = 23.45) than did those who received low performance feedback (Ye = 20.08), F(1, 
128) =2.78, p < .10, although the difference was only marginally significant. In contrast, among 
low performers (participants with performance at one standard deviation below the mean), those 
who received low performance feedback attempted more anagram questions (Ye = 21.96) than 
did those who received high performance feedback condition (Ye = 18.16), F(1, 128) = 3.58, p 
=.06. 3
The above results are consistent with my proposal that performance feedback influenced 
self-perception of performance, which in turn interacted with actual performance to affect the 
extent of effort withholding. To test this idea, I replaced performance feedback with perceived 
performance (participants’ responses to the manipulation check item) in the preceding analysis. 
The predicted interaction of perceived performance and actual performance was significant, F(1, 
128) = 8.16, p < .01, 2p = .06. When math test performance was high (one standard deviation 
above its mean), there was a positive slope relating perceived performance to the amount of 
preparatory effort, B = 1.06, t(128) = 2.37, p < .05. In contrast, when math performance was low 
(one standard deviation below its mean), there was a non-significant negative slope relating
perceived performance to the amount of preparatory effort, B = -0.89, t(128) = -1.72, p = .08. 
                                               
3
The number of anagrams attempted was highly correlated with the number of anagram solved (r = .62, p <.001), 
and I obtained the same result when the number of anagrams solved was the dependent variable in the preceding 
analysis. The predicted interaction of the math test performance and performance feedback was significant, F(2, 
132) = 8.12, p < .01, 2p = .06. In decomposing the interaction, I examined how performance feedback affected the 
number of anagrams solved as a function of math test performance. When math test performance was high (one 
standard deviation above its mean), participants receiving high performance feedback solved more anagrams (Ye = 
28.00) than did those receiving low performance feedback (Ye = 21.84), F(1, 132) = 5.29, p < .05. In contrast, when 
math performance was low (one standard deviation below its mean), participants receiving low performance 
feedback solved more anagrams (Ye = 25.31) than did those receiving high performance feedback (Ye = 23.64), 
although the difference was only marginally significant, F(1, 132) = 3.04, p = .08.
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Taken together, Study 2 results showed that inaccurate feedback, particularly unrealistic negative 
feedback, could lead to withdrawal of preparatory effort for upcoming ability test.
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CHAPTER 4
STUDY 3: TASK PERFORMANCE
Studies 1 and 2 showed that receiving inaccurate feedback increases the likelihood of 
practicing self-handicapping, which theoretically, should lower performance in subsequent 
ability tests. Study 3 was designed to test this hypothesis.
                                                                            Method
The participants were 223 European American undergraduates (95 females) students 
from an introductory psychology class in a public university in the United States. Their age 
ranged from 18 to 22 (M = 18.90 years, SD = 0.78). As in Study 1, participants were randomly 
assigned to receive either high or low bogus performance feedback after taking the SAT math 
test, and a control condition (no feedback) was run later to determine whether the effect was due 
to misperceptions of performance or accuracy in performance perception. Following the 
feedback manipulation, to examine the consequences of the feedback manipulation on 
performance in a subsequent unrelated task, I gave the participants 10 minutes to solve 15 
anagrams. Each anagram had three solutions, and the participants were asked to identify all three 
solutions by rearranging a string of letters into three meaningful words. The dependent measure 
was the number of correct solutions (out of 45) the participants could find. Upon completing the 
task, the participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation.
Results and Discussion
        Again, men had higher performance on the math test (M = 8.08, SD = 3.24) than did women 
(M = 5.89, SD = 2.68), F(1, 221) = 18.82, p < .001, 2p = .18. The mean number of correct 
answers for all participants was 6.64 (SD =3.07). No gender differences in the anagram test
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performance were found, Fs < 1, ns. The mean number of correct solutions for all participants 
was 20.45 (SD = 4.68).
I regressed performance on the anagram test on the participants’ performance on the math 
test (mean-centered), the performance feedback they received (high, low, no performance 
feedback), gender, and their interactions. As in Study 1, in this (and the subsequent) regression 
analysis that used feedback as a predictor, I coded feedback into two dummy variables, with the 
control condition as the reference category. The gender effects were not significant and I did not 
consider gender further. The main effect of performance feedback condition was reliable, F(2, 
217) = 4.08, p < .05, 2p = .04. Participants in the control condition performed better on the 
anagram task (M = 21.60, SD = 4.44) than did participants in the high feedback condition (M = 
19.31, SD = 5.12), F(1, 177) = 8.05, p < .01, 2p = .04. However, participants who received low
performance feedback (M = 20.71, SD = 4.58) did not differ from those who received high 
performance feedback, F(1, 90) = 1.65, ns, or no feedback, F(1, 167) = 1.18, ns. More important,
the predicted interaction of performance on the math test and performance feedback on the 
anagram test performance was significant, F(2, 217) = 6.88, p = .001, 2p = .06. 
I decomposed the interaction by examining how performance feedback influenced 
anagram performance in different levels of math performance. As shown in Figure 3, simple 
slope analysis results revealed that when math test performance was low (one standard deviation 
below its mean), participants receiving high performance feedback performed more poorly on 
the anagram test (Ye = 17.98) than did those receiving no performance feedback (Ye = 20.37),
F(1, 217) = 5.99, p < .05. Low performers receiving low performance feedback performed at the 
same level (Ye = 22.51) as low performers receiving no performance feedback (Ye = 20.37), F(1, 
217) = 1.28, p > .10. In contrast, when math performance was high (one standard deviation 
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above its mean), participants receiving low performance feedback had poorer performance (Ye = 
18.70) than those in the no feedback condition (Ye = 22.75), F(1, 217) = 7.76, p < .01. High 
performers receiving high performance feedback performed at the same level (Ye =21.11) as high 
performers receiving no feedback (Ye =22.75), F(1, 217) = 2.42, p > .10, ns. 
I also examined how anagram performance was related to math performance in each 
performance feedback condition. In the no performance feedback condition, math test 
performance was positively related to anagram test performance, B = 0.39, t(127) = 3.12, p < .05. 
That is, high (vs. low) performing students in the math test performed better in the anagram test. 
In the high performance feedback, math test performance was also positively related to anagram 
performance, B = 0.50, t(50) = 2.54, p < .05, indicating that when given positive performance 
feedback, high (vs. low) performers on the math test had better performance in the subsequent 
task. However, in the low performance feedback condition, math test performance was 
negatively related to anagram performance, B = -0.53, t(40) = -2.23, p < .05. That is, when given 
negative performance feedback, high (vs. low) performers had poorer performance in the 
subsequent task. In short, for both high and low performers, receiving inaccurate (unrealistic 
positive and unfounded negative) feedback undermined performance on the subsequent task.
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CHAPTER 5
STUDY 4: LONG-TERM ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE
Studies 1 to 3 are controlled experiments designed to demonstrate the causal effects of 
inaccurate self-assessments on self-handicapping and task performance. These studies showed 
that when individuals are led by bogus performance feedback to form overly positive or negative 
views of their performance, they have a greater tendency to practice self-handicapping, which 
could eventually affect task performance.
This conclusion appears to contradict results from many individual differences studies 
that have found positive effects of self-enhancement. I posit that this contradiction will dissolve 
when I consider several measurement issues that have obscured the negative effects of self-
enhancement relative to accurate self-assessment. In this and the next study, I seek to show that 
when self-enhancement is measured properly and compared to accurate self-assessment, self-
enhancement, like self-effacement, is associated with negative outcomes such as unsatisfactory 
academic achievement and low subjective well-being.
Measurement Issues
Many investigators have questioned the ways self-enhancement has been measured 
(Colvin & Block, 1994a; Colvin & Block, 1994b; Colvin, Block, & Funder, 1995; Kwan, John, 
Robins, & Kuang, 2008; Kwan, John, Kenny, & Bond, 2004). Colvin and his colleagues (1994a; 
1995) argued that many of the studies that have found psychological benefits of positive illusions
did not distinguish people who perceive that they possess positive qualities when they do not 
(self-enhancers) from those who perceive that they possess positive qualities when they do 
(people with accurate positive self-perceptions), because these studies did not include an external 
comparison target. For example, scores on Rosenberg’s (1965) Self-Esteem Scale, one of the 
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most frequently used measures to assess individuals’ positive self-perceptions, were used as a 
measure of individuals’ positive illusion about the self. However, high self-esteem does not 
necessarily imply positive illusion, unless it is not supported by possession of positive attributes. 
Social comparison (comparing self-ratings with ratings of others) and lack of 
self-insight (comparing self-ratings with ratings by others) are two widely used measures of self-
enhancement that include an external criterion. However, Kwan et al. (2004, 2008) observed that 
these measures also have limitations. Kwan and her colleagues argued that people who are 
considered self-enhancers in the social comparison approach (the ones who perceive themselves
more positively than they perceive others) do not self-enhance if they have better performance 
than others in reality. That is, the social comparison measure does not take into account the 
individuals’ actual ability (the target effect). In contrast, people who are considered to be self-
enhancers in the self-insight approach (people who perceive themselves more positively than 
others perceive them) are not necessarily self-enhancers because people have different evaluative 
standards (the perceiver effect). For example, when person A adopts more liberal standards in 
evaluating the self and others, person A’s self-ratings will be higher than others’ ratings of 
person A, giving rise to an apparent self-enhancement by person A. Thus, the apparent lack of 
self-insight may be an artifact of the perceiver effect.
       In light of these problems, a valid measure of self-enhancement should compare individuals’ 
self-assessments of performance with their actual performance (Kwan et al., 2008; see also 
Gramzow, Willard, & Mendes, 2008; Robins & Beers, 2001). However, Kwan et al. (2008) also 
cautioned that although using actual performance as the comparison standard takes care of the 
target effect, it does not remove the perceiver effect. For example, it is possible that “individuals 
who believe they are more academically competent than their actual grades indicate may believe 
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that individuals are generally more academically competent than their grade” (p. 1075). To 
control the perceiver effect, Kwan et al. (2008) recommended the use of rankings to measure 
self-assessment because rankings require all individuals to anchor their self-ratings on the same 
mean.
To address the aforementioned measurement issues, in the present study and the next 
study, I had the participants estimate the percentile scores of their performance and compared the 
participants’ self-reported performance assessments to their actual performance. Specifically, I 
had the participants take an objective test, compare their performance with the performance of 
other students in their school, and record their relative performance perception on a percentile 
rank that ranges from 0 (“I am at the bottom”) to 100 (“I am on the top”). After the studies were 
over, I calculated participants’ actual performance percentile rank. Next, I measured self-
enhancement by comparing participants’ perceived performance with their actual performance. 
Aside from the issue of comparison standard, in many past studies, researchers have used 
the difference score between self-assessments and a certain objective measure of the ability 
(actual performance, or peer evaluations) as an index of self-enhancement. This measure pits 
unrealistic positive self-assessment against unrealistic negative self-assessment, and hence 
cannot provide an accurate evaluation of whether self-enhancement relative to accurate self-
assessment will produce more beneficial effects. Specifically, a positive (or negative) correlation 
between this measure and a certain outcome variable does not imply that self-enhancement is 
associated with better (or worse) outcomes. Depending on the range of the observed difference 
scores, several alternative conclusions can be drawn from the results. To elaborate, suppose a 
positive correlation was found between the difference score and a certain outcome variable. If 
the observed difference scores cover positive values only, the result would indicate that 
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individuals with unfounded positive self-perceptions outperform those with accurate self-
assessment. However, if the observed difference scores cover negative values only, the same 
result would indicate that accurate self-assessors outperform self-effacers. Finally, if the 
observed difference scores cover both positive and negative values, the result would indicate that 
self-enhancers outperform the accurate self-assessors, who in turn outperform the self-effacers.
Thus, to examine whether self-enhancement (or self-effacement) is more beneficial than 
accurate self-assessments, in the present and the next study, instead of using the difference score 
as the independent variable, I used participants’ perceived performance, their actual performance 
on an objective test and the interaction of the two variables as predictors of the participants’ 
academic performance (the present study) and subjective well being (Study 5). The interaction 
allows direct assessment of how positive or negative misperceptions of task performance are 
related to the outcome variables when actual performance is high or low. That is, I can 
independently assess the effects of self-enhancement (positive self-perception when actual 
performance is low), self-effacement (negative self-perception when actual performance is high), 
and accurate self-assessment (self-perceptions are consistent with actual performance).
Method
The participants were 215 European American undergraduates (139 females) from an 
introductory psychology class in a public university in the United States. Their age ranged from 
18 to 27 (M = 19.97 years, SD = 1.23). The participants completed a set of 10 randomly selected 
items from the SATs (Scholastic Aptitude Tests). To extend the generalizability of the results, 3 
different sets of items were used: the 10 math problems used in the pilot test, a different set of 10 
math problems, or a set of 10 verbal problems. Because the results were identical across the three 
sets of items, I combined all data in my analysis.
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After completing the task, the participants estimated how well they performed on the test 
compared to other undergraduates in their university. They indicated their answer on a percentile 
scale that ranged from 0 (I’m at the very bottom) to 50 (I’m better than half and worse than half 
of other students) and 100 (I’m on the top). In addition, they indicated how many questions they 
thought they had answered correctly. Finally, they were asked to report their current GPA. One 
possible limitation of the present study is that I used self-reported GPA as the dependent 
measure, which is subject to memory distortions and other biases. However, the extent of these
biases has been reported to be relatively small (.10 or less in a 4-point scale) (Gramzow, Elliot, 
Asher, & McGregor, 20003; Gramzow, Willard, & Mendes, 2008; Gramzow & Willard, 2006).
Results and Discussion
The mean number of correct answers for all participants was 5.80 (SD = 1.97). Each 
participant was assigned a percentile rank based on their actual performance on the test relative 
to that of other participants who worked on the same task. A repeated measure ANOVA showed 
that the mean actual rank was lower (M = 57. 18, SD = 28.86) than the mean self-reported rank 
(M = 61.60, SD = 23.13), F(1, 214) = 6.43, p = .01, suggesting that on average, the participants 
reported their task performance to slightly higher than their actual performance. The correlation 
between actual and self-reported rank was .56, p < .001. The mean GPA was 3.43 (SD = .37).
Male participants performed better on the tests (M = 63.83, SD =27.56) than female 
participants (M = 53.54, SD = 28.99), F(1, 213) = 6.41, p = .01, 2p = .03. Male participants also 
perceived their performance more positively (M = 67.93, SD = 17.97) than did female 
participants (M = 58.14, SD=24.89), F(1, 213) = 9.02, p < .01, 2p = .04. However, there was no 
gender difference in the size of discrepancy between actual and perceived performance, F(1, 
213) = .03, ns. 
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I regressed reported GPA on (mean-centered) actual performance percentile, (mean-
centered) self-reported performance percentile, gender, and their interactions. Participants’
gender did not qualify my results and was not considered further. The predicted interaction of 
actual performance percentile and self-reported performance percentile was significant, F(1, 207) 
= 15.26, p < .001, 2p = .07, but the main effects were not. As shown in Figure 4, simple slope 
analysis results showed that participants who understated or overstated their relative performance 
had lower GPA than did those who perceived their high or low relative performance accurately. 
Among participants with high actual performance (one standard deviation above the mean), self-
reported performance was positively related to GPA, B = 0.005, t(207) = 2.76, p < .01. That is, 
among high performers, those who understated their performance more had lower GPA. Among 
participants with low performance (one standard deviation below the mean), self-reported 
performance was negatively related to GPA, B = -0.003, t(207) = -2.12, p < .05; among low 
performers, those who overstated their performance more had lower GPA.4
In short, my results revealed considerable individual differences in the tendency to 
overstate or understate one’s relative and absolute task performance. Moreover, those who 
misperceived their performance (both self-enhancers and self-effacers) tended to have lower 
GPA than those who perceived their performance accurately.
                                               
4
I also tested my hypothesis by replacing the self-reported percentile ranks with the participants’ self-reported 
number of correct items as the dependent variable. The predicted interaction of actual number of correct answers
and self-reported absolute number of correct answers again was significant, F(1, 207) = 9.54, p < .01, 2p = .05, but 
the main effects were not. In general, participants with inflated or deflated self-assessment of performance (vs. those 
who reported their high or low performance accurately) had lower GPA. Among participants with high actual 
performance (one standard deviation above the mean), there was a marginally significant trend for those who 
understated their performance more to have lower GPA, B = 0.04, t(207) = 1.69, p = .09. Among participants with 
low performance (one standard deviation below the mean), self-reported absolute performance was negatively 
related to GPA, B = -0.04, t(207) = -1.90, p = .06; among low performers, those who overstated their performance 
more tended to have lower GPA. 
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CHAPTER 6
STUDY 5: LIFE SATISFACTION
The present study was conducted to extend Study 4 results to a different population 
(students in Mainland China) and a different dependent measure (subjective well-being). In 
addition, instead of assessing actual and perceived performance on a lab test, I measured these 
variables with course examination in a classroom setting. Recent cross-cultural studies showed 
that although the extent of positive illusion of the self is smaller among Asians compared to 
European Americans (see Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999), the degree of association 
between positive illusion of the self and some psychological outcomes (e.g., subjective well-
being, persistence, challenge seeking) is comparable across the two cultures (Chiu & Kim, in 
press; Gaertner, Sedikides, & Chang, 2008; Kim, Chiu, Peng, Cai, & Tov, 2010; Kim, Peng, & 
Chiu, 2008; Sedikides et al., 2003). This suggests that my results can be generalized to Asians. 
Therefore, consistent with my general hypothesis, I expected those who overestimate or 
underestimate their performance would experience lower levels of subjective well-being, 
compared to those who more accurately assess their low or high performance. 
Method
The participants were 50 freshmen (37 females; mean age = 18.7 years) from two classes 
offered by the Law Department in a public university in Beijing, China. Each class had 25 
students. In both classes, the final examination was the first and only examination; there were no 
quizzes or mid-term examinations. Furthermore, these students were in the same program and 
were taking the same required courses in their first year of study. One month before the final 
examination, participants were asked to estimate the rank they would achieve in the class. 
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Aside from estimating their final examination rank, the participants also filled out the 
Chinese version of the Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS; Pavot & Diener, 1993). The scale 
consists of five items (e.g., “I was satisfied with my current life”; “In most ways my present life 
is close to my ideal”). The participants indicated their response on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging 
from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a lot). The alpha coefficient of the scale was .78 in the current study. At 
the end of the semester, with the participants’ permission, I obtained from the students’ 
university their actual ranks in the final examination.
Results and Discussion
        Female participants ranked higher (M = 12.89, SD =8.35) than male participants (M =19.62, 
SD = 7.18), F(1,48) = 6.67, p =.01, 2p = .12. However, men and women did not differ in 
perceived rank, F(1,48) = .004, ns. No difference was found between the mean actual rank (M
=14.64, SD = 8.53) and the mean estimated rank (M =13.74, SD = 8.23). Thus, unlike the 
American participants in Study 4 but consistent with past results (Heine et al., 1999), the Chinese 
participants in the present study did not display a general tendency to overestimate their 
performance. However, the extent of over-estimation was larger among male participants (M = 
6.00, SD = 6.71) than female participants (M = -0.89, SD= 7.15), F(1,48) = 9.21, p <.01, 2p = 
.16. The correlation between actual and estimated rank was .59, p < .001. The mean of the 
Satisfaction With Life Scale was 4.00 (SD = 1.29).
I regressed SWLS on (mean-centered) actual rank, (mean-centered) estimated rank, 
gender, and their interactions. Again, gender did not qualify my results and was not considered 
further. The predicted Actual Rank X Estimated Rank interaction was significant, F(1, 46) = 
8.99, p < .01, 2p = .16, but the main effects were not. As shown in Figure 5, simple slope 
analysis results showed that when actual rank was high (one standard deviation above its mean), 
36
estimated rank was positively related to SWLS, B = 0.08, t(48) = 1.98, p = .05. That is, among 
high rank performers, those who expected worse performance were less satisfied with their life.
In contrast, when actual rank was low (one standard deviation below its mean), there was a 
marginal negative correlation between estimated rank and SWLS, B = -0.054, t(48) = -1.85, p = 
.07. That is, among low performers, there was a non-significant trend for those who expected 
better performance to be less satisfied with their life. These results replicated and extended Study 
4 results, showing that both those who overestimated their class performance and those 
underestimated it had lower levels of life satisfaction, compared to those with accurate 
performance estimation.
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CHAPTER 7
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present research contributes to the research literature on the effects of self-
enhancement and self-effacement in two important ways. First, the psychological benefits and 
costs of self-enhancement is a contested issue in social psychology. The various issues 
surrounding the measurement of self-enhancement identified in recent research (see Kwan et al., 
2004, 2008) have obscured the psychological costs of self-enhancement. In the present research, 
by clarifying these measurement issues, I found consistent evidence that like self-effacement, 
self-enhancement can have psychological costs. Second, the present research also provides 
evidence for the causal effects of self-enhancement and self-effacement on self-handicapping, 
performance, and subjective well-being. In short, I have obtained convergent results regarding 
the negative effects of self-enhancement from both experimental and correlational studies using a 
variety of dependent measures and diverse subject populations. These results show that having 
distorted self-views, regardless of whether the distortions are self-derogatory or self-ingratiating, 
could be a psychological liability.
Psychological Costs of Inaccurate Self-Assessment
To elaborate, as shown in Studies 4 and 5 results, there are considerable individual 
differences in how accurately people perceive their performance. Moreover, when self-
enhancement and self-effacement are measured through independent assessments of actual and 
self-reported performance, both types of misperceptions of performance are linked to lower 
academic performance (Study 4) and life satisfaction (Study 5). These results indicate that past 
inconsistent findings regarding the psychological benefits and costs of self-enhancement are in 
part due to the measurement issues I reviewed in the Introduction to Study 4. Once these 
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measurement issues are clarified, the evidence consistently shows that misperceptions of one’s 
task performance may have performance and well-being costs. 
Evidence from the three experiments (Studies 1 to 3) provided further evidence for the 
psychological costs of misperceptions of performance. The results showed that experimentally 
induced self-enhancement and self-effacement raised the likelihood of practicing self-
handicapping (taking test under distraction in Study 1, and withholding preparatory effort in 
Study 2) and reduced task performance (Study 3). Studies 1 and 2 results further illustrate that 
inaccurate performance feedback, irrespective of whether the feedback is overly positive or 
negative, can increase the concern over the self-implications of task performance. Receiving 
feedback that is more favorable than expected (based on past experiences with taking tests in the 
same domain) can lead to an inflated self-view and the motivation to preserve it. Such motivation 
reduces the motivation to verify one’s actual ability in subsequent tasks. Likewise, receiving 
feedback that is less favorable than expected creates self-doubt over one’s actual ability and the 
motivation to protect one’s self-esteem by avoiding diagnostic feedback from future tasks that 
may further indict one’s low ability. The increased tendency to practice self-handicapping and 
the heighted concern over performance associated with self-enhancement and self-effacement 
also explain why compared to accurate self-assessors, self-enhancers and self-effacers tend to 
have lower task performance (Study 3), academic achievement (Study 4), and life satisfaction 
(Study 5). Because self-enhancers and self-effacers tend to practice self-handicapping (they 
withhold preparatory and prefer taking tasks under distraction), they tend to have poor task 
performance and academic achievement. Because self-enhancers and self-effacers experience 
heightened concern over performance, they experience greater anxiety and stress in academic 
situations and have relatively low levels of life satisfaction. 
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This interpretation is consistent with the past findings that although positive self-
evaluations are associated with many positive psychological outcomes (Taylor & Brown, 1988), 
these perceptions may undermine achievement motivation, future achievement, and subjective 
well-being when they become overly discrepant with actual performance (Colvin, Block, & 
Funder, 1995; Greham, Lane, ManMillan, Bocian, & Ward, 2000; Robins & Beer, 2001). 
Psychological Benefits of Accurate Self-Assessment
Compared to self-enhancers and self-effacers, individuals with accurate self-assessment 
are less likely to practice self-handicapping. Instead, accurate self-assessors can take advantage 
of the accurate feedback to facilitate self-regulated learning. For example, as shown in previous 
studies, when high performers have knowledge of their performance and feel that they will do 
well in the task domain, they are most motivated to invest their intellectual resource to yield 
higher performance in that task domain (Forstering & Morgenstern, 2002). Thus, compared to 
self-enhancers and self-effacers, accurate self-assessors tend to have higher academic 
achievement and subjective well-being.
In Study 2, the high performers expended more preparatory effort upon receiving 
accurate (vs. inaccurate) feedback than did the low performers. Two reasons might account for 
this result. First, the negative performance feedback might have deflated the low performers’ 
self-efficacy, which in turn, could hurt their motivation to engage in the preparatory learning 
activities (Bandura, 1977). Given this possibility, when teachers provide negative performance 
feedback to low performers, caution must be taken to separate the performance feedback from 
the evaluation of the person, and direct performance feedback specifically toward helping the 
learners calibrate their self-appraisal without lowering their self-worth (Kamins & Dweck, 
1999). 
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Second, the participants in this study were provided with norm-referenced performance 
feedback (feedback on their performance relative to their peers). Because norm-referenced
feedback may evoke a performance goal, low performers receiving this feedback may develop a 
sense of learned helplessness (Elliot, & McGregor, 2001; Grant & Dweck, 2003). Interestingly, 
given the possibility that my negative feedback might lower the low performers’ self-efficacy 
and activate a performance goal, the low performers receiving (accurate) negative feedback still 
exhibited a slightly stronger learning motivation than the low performers receiving positive 
feedback. This result further underscores the learning benefits of accurate self-assessment versus 
self-enhancement among low performers. Nonetheless, it would be important to examine the 
generality of my results when the participants received different kinds of performance feedback 
(e.g., criterion-referenced vs. norm-referenced feedback, ability-focused vs. effort-focused 
feedback) (Kamins & Dweck, 1999; Mueller & Dweck, 1998).
Limitations and Future Directions
In the present research, I assumed that the participants had fairly accurate knowledge of 
their actual performance. Therefore, the discrepancy between perceived performance and actual 
performance should reflect motivated distortions of one’s own performance. My pilot test result 
is consistent with this assumption: When given explicit instructions to be accurate, the 
participants were able to report their actual performance in focal test fairly accurately (r = .81 
between perceived and actual performance). However, in the absence of the explicit instructions, 
as was the case in Studies 4 and 5, the correlation between perceived and actual performance 
dropped to .56 in Study 4 and .59 in Study 5. Based on past research on self-enhancement and 
self-protection motivations, I speculate that self-enhancers overstate their actual performance to 
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maintain a favorable view of the self, whereas self-effacers understate their actual performance 
because of self-doubt over their performance. 
In present research, I did not manipulate the specific motivations behind self-
enhancement or self-effacement. My major research goal was to examine the downstream 
motivational and performance consequences of self-enhancement and self-effacement. In the 
context of this research goal, in Studies 1 to 3, I used bogus performance feedback to simulate 
the experiences of self-enhancement and self-effacement in the laboratory and observed their 
psychological consequences. I seek to show that independent of what motivates self-
enhancement and self-effacement, once the participants were led to view their performance as 
more positively or negatively than their actual performance, they would display the predicted 
downstream consequences of self-enhancement and self-effacement. Thus, I did not manipulate 
the motivations to self-enhance or self-efface, although I believe I need future studies that 
manipulate the motivations behind these biases to shed light on the motivational basis of my 
phenomena. For instance, a recent study showed that self-enhancement in self-reported GPA 
predicted poorer subsequent academic performance (Gramzow et al., 2003) – a finding consistent 
with my general conclusion. However, these investigators also found that the motive behind self-
enhancement moderated the relationship between self-enhancement and future performance. 
When self-enhancement is motivated by an approach goal, self-enhancement is positively related 
to subsequent academic performance. However, when self-enhancement is driven by an 
avoidance goal, self-enhancement is negatively related to subsequent performance. These results 
underscore the importance of probing the motivational dynamics of self-enhancement and self-
effacement.
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An alternative explanation for my phenomena is that people with higher meta-cognitive 
ability tend to be more accurate in assessing their actual performance and hence are more well-
adjusted and have better performance. Furthermore, providing individuals with accurate 
feedback may increase their awareness of their performance, and hence improve future 
performance and reduce self-handicapping. However, the meta-cognition account does not 
explain why people tend to more accurate in assessing their performance when they receive 
explicit instructions to be accurate than when they do not. Furthermore, it is well-documented in 
the literature that high performers tend to have higher meta-cognitive awareness of their 
performance (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). Studies 4 and 5 showed that high performers, who are 
expected to have high meta-cognitive skills, often under-report their performance, and when they
do, they have relatively low GPAs and life satisfaction. In short, although meta-cognition plays a 
crucial role in explaining self-enhancement (Kruger & Dunning, 1999), it does not fully explain 
my results.  
The focus of the present research is on self-enhancement of performance on a focal task, 
whereas many past studies self-enhancement have examined the effects of self-enhancement of 
personality traits. Future research is needed to verify whether inflated and deflated self-
assessment of personality would produce the same effects of self-enhancive and self-effacing 
perceptions of task performance. 
Conclusion
In summary, under the influence of the self-esteem movement, teachers are often 
pressurized to provide unfounded positive feedback to the students (Seligman, Reivich, Jaycox, 
& Gillham, 1995). My results underscore the importance of providing accurate performance 
feedback to students. These results resonate with the ancient Greeks’ emphasis on knowing 
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thyself – Acknowledging one’s strengths and weaknesses, rather than having distorted views of 
one’s performance, is linked to higher academic achievement, subsequent performance, and 
preparatory effort for future achievement task, and life satisfaction. Encouraging students, 
children, friends, colleagues, and learners to perceive their ability more positively (or negatively) 
than their actual ability or providing them with unfounded positive (or negative) performance 
feedback could lower their motivation and performance on later tasks and reduce their life 
satisfaction.
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                                                                                                        FIGURES
Figure 1. Noise level chosen as a function of test performance and performance feedback.
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Figure 2. The number of anagrams attempted as a function of the math test performance and 
performance feedback.
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Figure 3. Anagram test performance as a function of the math test performance and performance 
feedback.
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Figure 4. GPA as a function of actual and self-reported performance percentile.
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Figure 5. Subjective well-being as a function of actual and estimated class rank.
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